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The principle of subsidiarity lies at the heart of the European Union’s strife to 
bring the EU closer to the citizen.2 Yet, it appears to be failing to do so in its 
present form. Therefore, the new Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
[hereafter: European Constitution] has the intention to bring it to the best possible 
position in this respect. 
  
After long discussions on the issue of the distribution of competences between 
the European Community and its Member States, it was tried to clarify this by 
introducing in the Treaty of Maastricht what is at present Art. 5 EC. This provision 
covers the notions of attribution, subsidiarity and proportionality, which, when 
added up, should deal with all aspects of this distribution of competences. The 
principle of attribution lays down the basic rule of public international law that the 
international organization can only exercise the competences in those policy 
fields which have been given to it in the treaty of establishment. Subsidiarity is in 
this respect meant to determine the remaining role of the Member States in the 
exercise of the competences thus transferred to the international organization. 
Proportionality then limits the scope of the transferred powers even further. 
The principle of subsidiarity is a special case among these: not only does 
it deal with the position of the Member States but also with the position of the 
citizen in these Member States. This is so because subsidiarity is traditionally 
linked to the necessity to bring the European Community and European Union as 
close to the citizen as  possible, namely through the role of national parliaments 
in case a competence can better be exercised at the national level. 
                                                
1 Erasmus University Rotterdam, School of Law, Section of European Law. 
2 See the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, as 
annexed to the Treaty on Establishing the European Community. 
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Since its introduction into the European Community legal system in the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993, the principle of subsidiarity has therefore attracted much 
attention, both in politics and in literature. Its meaning and scope were unclear, 
its working in practice unknown. The principle of subsidiarity concerns the 
distribution of competences between the European Community and its Member 
States and is at present formulated in Art. 5 (second sentence) TEC: 
 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. 
 
This definition in itself already reflects that application in practice of the notion of 
subsidiarity easily runs into difficulties. It is often pointed out3 that the wording 
leaves too much room to manoeuvre, like the terms ‘sufficiently achieved’ and 
‘better achieved’. Relatively vague terms are at the heart of the contents of 
subsidiarity. For a more effective functioning, this notion of subsidiarity should be 
improved, both in wording and in intent. This probably is why it does not play and 
important role in EU law, in the legal decisions under EU law. 
For these reasons, the principle of subsidiarity was under debate at the 
Convention. Different aspects were proposed to amend the present text or to be 
added to it. Yet, the definition of subsidiarity itself (Art. I-11 sub 3 of the  
European Constitution4) will not change. In two important other ways, the 
European Constitution will bring changes to the system of subsidiarity as we 
know it under present-day European Union law. The first way concerns the 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, in 
which the new procedural rules for the application of subsidiarity are laid down, 
including an important role for the national parliaments. Secondly, lists are 
included containing the policy fields which are exclusive and non-exclusive to the 
                                                
3 Tim Koopmans, Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary, in: European Constitutional Law Review, 
1: 112-116, 2005.  
4 As numbered in CIG 87/1/04 REV 1, 13 October 2004. 
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European Union. This is important to the application of the notion of subsidiarity 
since it can only be applied to non-exclusive competence fields.  
The above means that only the application will change, not the contents of 
the notion of subsidiarity as such, or at least that the application will lead to 
changes which influence the contents. It is therefore necessary to study the 
present-day situation first, followed by the amendments to it in the European 
Constitution, concluding with the implications in the European Constitution for the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity. In this way, it will be possible to 
consider an answer to the question whether the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity as embedded in the European Constitution, will bring the European 
Union closer to the citizens. As will be shown, both changes may influence the 
position of the Member States and their parliaments, or at least have the 
intention to do so. 
 
 
2. Subsidiarity under the Present System 
 
As mentioned above, the principle of subsidiarity has been a much debated issue 
under European law since the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993. 
Elements of importance are most notably the role of subsidiarity in case law, its 
political value in many aspects, and its role and possibilities in practice. From the 
beginning, thus, it appears that it has mainly been a political instrument: although 
much emphasis is placed on it in practice and in literature, it has never played an 
important role in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EC. Yet, the working 
group on the role of national parliaments at the European Convention considered 
subsidiarity to be a potential means to strengthen the position of national 
parliaments in the European decision-making process. 
 
There are several reasons why the principle of subsidiarity was not able to play 
an important role. Although it was tried several times, most notably by 
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Advocates-General,5 the Court of Justice only discussed it as a secondary point 
of legal argumentation.6 A role for the Court of Justice would be the only 
possibility for judicial scrutiny since the Court of Justice has the task to check the 
working of the Treaty, as stated in Art. 221 TEC. Involvement of national courts is 
therefore not foreseen. Yet, the tools the Court of Justice has been given, make it 
very difficult to objectively evaluate the application of the principle in actual 
cases. The first one concerns the policy fields on which it can be applied: only 
the non-exclusive competences. Yet, there is some discussion about which 
policy fields fall under this.7 Does the fact that a policy field is mentioned in one 
of the Treaties mean that it is an exclusive competence of the European Union? 
The answer to this question is relevant to both the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the possibility for the European Community at present to 
exercise the same competences in external relations. For subsidiarity, it needs to 
be decided per policy field whether it falls under the exclusive competences or 
not. This decision is based upon an evaluation of  the extent of European 
legislation in the field, not on solid facts, which is the reason why there is much 
debate about each policy field to which the rule of exclusive competence may 
apply. 
 A second vague notion in Art. 5 TEC is “sufficiently achieved”. A similar 
problem concerns the linked notions of “scale of effects” and “better achieved”. 
For the application of these notions, a rather subjective weighing of the 
circumstances is necessary, something that cannot be asked of a court which 
can only judge on the basis of objective legal criterions. The application of these 
vague notions would mean  a stronger political opinion than the Court of Justice 
                                                
5 For instance Conclusion of Advocate-General Pergola in case C-35/98, Minister of Finance vs 
B.G.M. Verkooijen, 24 June 1999, or Conclusion of Advocate-General Geelhoed in case C-
491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited and Imperial Tobacco Limited vs 
Secretary of State for Health, 10 September 2002. 
6 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Lts vs Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 
October 2003; Case C-377/98, The Netherlands vs European Parliament and Council, judgment 
of the Court of Justice of 9 October 2001. 
7 Gráinne de Búrca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam, Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 7/99, pp.18-20; Manuel Medina-Ortega, A Constitution for an Enlarged 
Europe, 2004, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 393. 
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is willing to give.8 All innovative steps forward by the Court of Justice have se far 
been made possible by a stricter legal interpretation of the EC Treaty and of 
secondary legislation.9 This element of the legal definition of the principle of 
subsidiarity has made it very difficult for it to be part of the Court of Justice case 
law. 
 Yet, the question arises whether such a case law development would be 
necessary or required. Subsidiarity does play an important role in practice, 
namely as a political notion.10 During negotiations for new EU legislation, the 
Member States apparently pay attention to a possible application of the principle 
of subsidiarity.11 The principle of subsidiarity is in this way very relevant and is 
applied, but its importance lies in political negotiations rather than in legal merits. 
Does this mean that the text in the EC Treaty is obsolete as it is sometimes 
suggested?12 The fact remains that it can only be referred to by the Member 
States during negotiations because it is in the text of the EC Treaty. 
 
A final important role in the application of the principle of subsidiarity is played by 
the special Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, added to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
 
For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle shall be 
met: the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member 
States' action in the framework of their national constitutional system and can therefore 
be better achieved by action on the part of the Community. 
 
The following guidelines should be used in examining whether the abovementioned 
condition is fulfilled: 
— the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by action by Member States; 
— actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the 
requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid 
disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would 
otherwise significantly damage Member States' interests; 
                                                
8 Tim Koopmans, op.cit. 
9 Gráinne de Búrca, op.cit. 
10 See also Phil Syrpis, In Defense of Subsidiarity, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, no. 2 (2004), 
pp. 323-334. 
11 As can for instance be deducted from the states-of-affairs sent by the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to Dutch Parliament every three months. A ‘subsidiarity test’ for each piece of EU 
legislation under negotiation, is included. 
12 As is described by Manuel Medina-Ortega, op.cit. 
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— action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or 
effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.13
  
Thus, an explanation of the fact that the principle of subsidiarity is meant as a 
political instrument in practice was added to the text of the EC Treaty in an 
attempt to remove any confusion about the application of the principle in practice 
and in literature. 
 
 3. Subsidiarity under the European Constitution 
 
Is this embedding of the principle of subsidiarity in practice going to change 
under the European Constitution? At least the wording of the present Art. 5 TEC 
will not be amended and will be repeated in Art. I-11 sub 3 Eur. Const. Yet, the 
circumstances under which the principle will function, will change in at least two 
important ways. Firstly, the European Constitution contains a clear list of 
exclusive policy fields. Secondly, the subsidiarity principle will play an important 




3.1. Policy Fields in the European Constitution 
 
For policy fields, subsidiarity has thus always been different for exclusive and for 
shared competences: only the latter category being subject to the subsidiarity 
test in both the original and the future version of the principle. Which policy fields 
are shared between the EU and the Member States and which are not, has not 
always been very clear. In the European Constitution, however, exhaustive lists 
have been drawn up in Art. I-13 for exclusive competences14 and in Art. I-14 for 
shared competences15. The list of exclusive competences in Art. I-13 appears to 
                                                
13 Art. 5 of the Protocol. 
14 Exclusive competences are those which are exclusively in the hands of the European Union. 
15 Shared competences are shared by the Member States and the European Union. 
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be rather limited: monetary policy, common commercial policy, customs union 
and the conservation of marine biological resources.  
The contents of these lists have changed from draft version of the 
European Constitution to draft version:16 which policy field falls under which list? 
The decisions were based on the acquis communautaire without introducing new 
elements into the present-day system of distribution of competences between the 
EU and the Member States. This means that the disputes over this in practice 
and literature had to be settled. However, this does not mean that everyone 
holds the opinion that each competence is in the correct list in the European 
Constitution. 
The new system means that, on the one hand, most of the possible 
disputes on the division of competences between the EU and the Member States 
will be solved automatically by the list. On the other hand, it is very well possible 
that this strict listing and division may lead to an enlargement of the number of 
policy fields to which the principle of subsidiarity may apply. This is an 
unavoidable effect from the wish of the Member States to recognize as few 
exclusive powers for the European Union as possible, thus ensuring their own 
influence on these policy fields. And some of those are limited within their own 
scope, like the monetary policy, which only applies to the ‘euro’ Member States. 
In practice, this system of lists of competences may enhance the scope of 
cases in which the principle of subsidiarity can be applied since it potentially 
enlarges the number of fields with non-exclusive competences. 
 
 
3.2. The New Protocol 
 
The second change concerning the principle of subsidiarity does not find its 
origins in the wish to evaluate the distribution of competences between the 
European Union and the Member States, but in the wish to bring the European 
                                                
16 See the different drafts by the European Convention for this at:http://european-
convention.eu.int. 
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Union closer to the citizen through the national parliaments. At the Convention, 
the Working Group on the Principle of Subsidiarity sought a means through 
which the involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making 
process could be enhanced in view of the idea of democracy. Several 
possibilities were discussed and several proposed. 17 This is instead of 
strengthening an early involvement of national parliaments in the decision-
making at the European level, for instance, or instead of pursuing a stronger link 
between the national parliaments and their national ministers in the Council, a 
link which differs from Member State to Member State right now.18 It was decided 
instead by this Working Group that the principle of subsidiarity would be a 
qualified tool for the national parliaments on a much larger scale, namely by 
giving specific rights to the national parliaments in the application of subsidiarity 
to each piece of EU legislation under negotiation.19
This suggestion by the Working Group was accepted by the Convention 
and is now laid down in a new Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality. This gives a formal role to the national 
parliaments of the Member States in two ways.  
Firstly, the national parliaments of the Member States have been given a 
six-week period to apply the subsidiarity test themselves to European draft 
legislation, the same period as the European Parliament has been given for its 
first reaction (Artt. 3 and 5 of the Protocol). In this way, the principle of 
subsidiarity will be applied on both sides of the scale: both by the national 
parliaments and by the Commission, who has the obligation to justify the 
legislative proposal (Art. 4 of the Protocol). Secondly, the opinion of the national 
parliaments has to be taken into serious consideration by the European 
institutions, especially if one third of the national parliaments are against it in this 
                                                
17 Erwin Teufel, Effective competence monitoring and checking in the legislative process of the 
European Union, Working Group I, Working document 6, 6 July 2002. 
18 Although a special Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union is 
meant to stress their role through early involvement and expression of their opinion on pending 
European legislation. 
19 Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, 23 September 2002, CONV 
286/02. 
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way.20 This is sometimes referred to as an ‘alarm bell procedure’. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the two Chambers of Parliament have already begun 
to set up a system to work with this Protocol: when to react, how to react and 
how to decide.21 An interesting third element is the role the Court of Justice may 
play in this new procedure (Art. 7 of the Protocol): an emphasis on the Court of 
Justice to hear cases regarding the principle of subsidiarity, with a special role for 
national parliaments which can ask their government to start a procedure. 
 
The result is that the position of the principle of subsidiarity could shift. Under the 
present structure in the European Union, the decision on subsidiarity matters lies 
at the European level: only the European institutions, and in the last stage 
especially the Court of Justice, are allowed to apply the principle of subsidiarity. It 
is a principle laid down in the EC Treaty, which the national governments or 
parliaments cannot apply themselves. In the European Constitution, this will be 
changed into a partly European partly national decision. Especially the role of the 
national parliaments may lead to this result. 
 
 
4. Possible effects 
 
In conclusion, several effects may possibly occur in the n earfuture because of 
the changes concerning the application of the principle of subsidiarity under the 
European Constitution. This could also mean that there would be a necessity for 
national parliaments to consider European legislation early in the EU decision-
making process, which has the potential to bring the EU closer to the citizens 
through an enhancement of the level of transparency and democracy for the 
citizens. 
                                                
20 When proposals in the field of Justice and Home Affairs are under consideration, this alarm bell 
procedure can start after a quarter of the national parliaments have this opinion. 
21 See the Advies van de Gemengde Commissie Toepassing Subsidiariteit betreffende de 
parlementaire behandeling van Europese wetsvoorstellen, First and Second Chamber of 
Parliament, October 2004. 
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 The question remains whether more involvement of national parliaments 
in the EU decision-making process is the preferable means to reach this goal. It 
the attention will move away from the European Parliament, which is another 
directly elected body within the European institutional structure. Where a choice 
could be made between strengthening the position of the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments in this respect, the European Parliament will not 
play an important role.  
A second possible effect which could very well be an undesirable effect, is 
a growing involvement of the Court of Justice in solving issues rising from the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity on the basis of the Protocol. At present, 
the principle of subsidiarity is a more political concept. Yet, it could very well be 
juridified in effect through the changes in the European Constitution since there 
would be more legal procedures available for all institutions involved. The 
growing involvement of national parliaments, on the other hand, could also mean 
that it would become even more political with a risk of alienating the citizens 
when national parliaments fail to successfully claim the right to act in certain 
policy field: which effect will such a situation have, when one or more national 
parliaments fail to successfully claim the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity? When one starts from the point of view that the Protocol could bring 
the EU closer to the citizen via the national parliaments, the one third 
requirement could have the opposite effect as well. What if a national parliament 
is scheduling a discussion at a very late moment so that the result of the 
discussion will not have any effect on the application of the Protocol? 
Another effect concerns the possible shift of competences resulting from 
the introduction of exhaustive lists of competences. This could very well lead to a 
shift in the number of cases in which the notion of subsidiarity could play a role, 
provided that some policy fields now considered by some Member States to be 
exclusive, are not in the list of exclusive competences. Closely linked to this is 
the position of the competences which are now falling under the second and third 
pillar. They are largely outside the EC, which is covered by the principle of 
subsidiarity and by giving the Court of Justice more powers to decide in disputes 
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concerning the second and third pillar, a shift in application of these 
competences is easily to be foreseen. 
  
All the arguments above lead to an answer to the question whether the principle 
of subsidiarity under the European Constitution could bring the EU closer to the 
citizens. The application in practice of it, however, could go both ways. The 
intention of the texts clearly points towards a positive answer to the question. 
Yet, these will be elements connected to the application of both the principle itself 
and the Protocol, which could lead to an opposite result.  
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